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Résumé
Le droit de bénéficier du progrès scienti-fique et de ses applications a pendant 
longtemps été négligé, tant en théorie qu’en 
pratique. Même les chercheurs, avocats ou 
juristes profondément impliqués dans le 
domaine des droits de l’homme expriment 
une incertitude quant à ce que le droit à la 
science requiert concrètement … si tant est 
qu’ils aient connaissance de son existence. 
Cette contribution a pour but de remédier à 
cette obscurité en apportant des précisions, 
tant philosophiques que pratiques, relatives 
au droit à la science. En résumé, le droit à la 
science appelle à appréhender la science et la 
technologie en tant que bien public global, à 
développer au bénéfice de l’humanité et à 
rendre accessible à tous, au même titre que 
d’autres droits économiques, sociaux et cultu-
rels tels le droit à la santé ou le droit à l’éduca-
tion. Cette contribution élaborera par la suite 
ce que cette vision large du droit à la science 
aura comme effet sur le contenu obligatoire 
minimum de ce droit. L’accent sera ainsi mis 
sur la réconciliation d’une tension potentielle 
entre le droit à la science et les régimes de pro-
priété intellectuelle.
Abstract
T he right to enjoy the benefits of scien-tific progress has long been neglected, 
both in theory and in practice. Even schol-
ars, advocates, and jurists deeply involved in 
the human rights field are likely to express 
uncertainty as to what the right to science 
concretely requires… if they are even aware 
of its existence. This article seeks to remedy 
that obscurity, providing a highly accessible 
account of the right to science that is both 
philosophically grounded and concrete. In 
short, the right to science calls for treating 
scientific research, scientific knowledge, 
and technology as global public goods, to be 
cultivated for the benefit of humanity and 
made accessible to all, just as with other 
socioeconomic rights such as education and 
healthcare. This article then elaborates what 
that broad vision means for minimum core 
content. Particular emphasis is given to rec-
onciling the potential tension between the 
right to science and intellectual property 
regimes.
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I. Introduction and Summary
Thinking about the right to science is at once very old and very new. It is old, in the sense that the textual basis for this right, and the debates about its 
inclusion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), date back to the 
1940s.1 During the 1960s and 1970s this debate was rekindled in the context of 
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. But in another sense the 
debate is also still new. The right to science remains today at a very early stage of 
conceptualization compared to the right to education or the right to health – and 
even more so compared to freedom of expression or the right to privacy. Even 
people deeply involved in the human rights field are frequently unaware of the 
existence of a right to science, much less of its meaning. Thus the right to science 
is a human right whose conceptual content needs to be both recovered and fur-
ther developed.
Recognizing this need, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) organized a Seminar on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific 
Progress and its Applications in October of 2013.2 This Seminar implemented one 
of the recommendations made by Farida Shaheed, the UN Special Rapporteur in 
the field of Cultural Rights, in her Report to the Human Rights Council the prior 
year.3 Shaheed had suggested a participatory process to improve the conceptual 
clarity of “the right to science and related obligations,” as an area of human rights 
law that had long been neglected as a matter of both theory and practice. The 
Seminar proved to be lively and generative, bringing together a global group of 
experts to share perspectives over two days. This essay reflects some important 
new insights that came out of that seminar, as well as a later academic workshop 
hosted by the University of Fribourg, at which the papers of this symposium were 
presented and developed.
This essay seeks to do two things to contribute to greater conceptual clarity 
regarding the right to science.
Part  II establishes a theoretical foundation for the right through a discussion 
of its fundamental principles. Toward this end, the discussion emphasizes the 
animating spirit of science as a public good, with both instrumental and intrinsic 
value, to be directed toward the service of humanity, guided by values of partici-
pation and inclusion. Science and technology have significant power as a means 
to the end of improving the human situation, but the scientific endeavor also has 
inherent value as a way in which individuals and communities give expression 
1 UN General Assembly, Resolution 217 A (III), 10  December 1948, (A/RES/3/217 A). Article  27(1) state that 
“Everyone has the right…to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.”
2 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights the seminar on the right to enjoy the bene-
fits of scientific progress and its applications, presented at the twenty-sixth session of the Human Rights Council 
(1 April 2014) (A/HRC/26/19).
3 Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights Ms.  Farida Shaheed on the right to enjoy the 
benefits of scientific progress and its applications, presented at the twentieth session of the Human Rights Council 
(14 May 2012) (A/HRC/20/26).
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to a unique aspect of the human personality, much like the arts and other forms 
of culture. To bring life to these values, however, not just any science will do. 
Realizing the human rights potential of the science and technology requires a 
philosophical and practical commitment to science and technology in service of 
humanity, rather than in service of state power or private profit. In particular, 
the human rights approach requires a conception of science and technology as 
public goods, which must be supported and cultivated and made accessible to all 
people – as with education and health care. To achieve this goal, scientific norms 
and innovation policy must consciously prioritize broad public participation in 
the scientific and technological process, and ensure widespread access to new 
technologies, particularly for the poor and other vulnerable populations.
Yet it is one thing to talk about the general principles and spirit of the right to 
science, and quite another to define the specific legal obligations and concrete 
standards it entails. Particularly in the context of socioeconomic rights, it is often 
difficult to make this translation from abstract principles to concrete legal obliga-
tions. To take a contrasting example, freedom of expression also began its legal 
life as an abstract principle or aspiration. Over the course of centuries, however, 
this right has benefitted from extensive advocacy, debate, and clarification. The 
resulting clarity gives us greater confidence today that we understand what 
“freedom of expression” actually means : that this human right is more than just 
a rhetorical claim, but is capable of judicial review and carries specific content… 
even though reasonable people may disagree about some aspects of that content. 
This much-needed process of advocacy, debate, and clarification, however, is still 
at an early stage when it comes to the right to science.
To advance this goal of concretization, Part III then proceeds to speak more 
specifically about what States must do to honor the right to science, by exploring 
what “minimum core content” might be attributed to this right. Four concep-
tually distinct approaches to elaborating the minimum core content of human 
rights are deployed, seeking to translate the high-level principles elaborated in 
the first part of the essay into more concrete legal obligations. The discussion 
begins by highlighting the problematic nature of a “core consensus” approach to 
defining the content of the right to science, at a time when the right still struggles 
for recognition. Next, the “normative essence” approach is identified as a more 
promising method, suggesting a concept of “essential technologies” to which all 
people should enjoy affordable access. Third, the “minimum obligations” approach 
focuses more explicitly on the duties of States in respect of the right to science, 
highlighting universal access to clean water, sanitation, electricity, the Internet, 
and other essential technological services ; academic and Internet freedom ; 
protection against the use of technology to abuse privacy or other human rights ; 
public access to publicly funded research ; and intellectual property rules that are 
adopted through a publicly transparent process enabling an appropriate balancing 
of interests in protection and in access. Finally, the essay proposes a fourth, “prag-
matic approach” to minimum core content, which responds to particular issues 
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and challenges of our time. This section discusses the relevance of the right to 
science to current battles over access to medicines for addressing the HIV/AIDs 
crisis, other key conflicts between the right to science and the current expan-
sionist trend in regulation of intellectual property, and debates over Internet 
governance and freedom.
Throughout this work, I will use the phrase “the right to science” rather than the 
more formal phrase “the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and 
its Applications” or its common abbreviation “REBSP”. The task before us is one 
of promoting dialogue and discussion about this right and advancing conceptual 
clarity ; these goals are best facilitated when we have a simple and straightfor-
ward way to name what we are talking about. Not so long ago, the human rights 
community dutifully spoke of “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” Fortunately we have 
by now exchanged that awkward phrasing for the shorter and simpler phrase “the 
right to health,” without losing sight of the rich complexity of meaning behind 
this convenient shorthand. The time has come to similarly speak of “the right to 
science.”
This of course still begs the question of what we mean by “science.” As with any 
powerful concept  – such as “rights,” “equality,” or “law”  – the word “science” is 
subject to many different usages. Indeed, this essay intentionally draws upon 
multiple meanings of the term. Perhaps the best definition I can offer of the 
term “science” as I use it in this essay would be : the systematic application of 
the human powers of inquiry, observation, and reason to better understand the 
world ; often, but not necessarily, with the aim of finding ways to improve it. In 
the broadest sense, the term “science” is a placeholder for the scientific endeavor, 
the body of knowledge produced by science, and its technological applications. 
“Science” in this conception includes anthropology and philosophy as much as 
medicine and engineering. It is broad enough to encompass traditional knowl-
edge systems and other epistemologies foreign to the university.4 It also holds 
room for the efforts of amateurs as well as professional scientists who are highly 
trained in specific traditions. This approach to the concept of science specifically 
rejects as too narrow the common usage of the term to refer only to specific 
branches, disciplines, or methods of modern academic enquiry that are empir-
ical, quantitative, or positivist ; for example defining “the sciences” in contrast 
to “the humanities” or “the arts.” Science is a form of human culture, a complex 
collaborative endeavor of meaning-making and creativity. It inevitably relies 
upon subjective interpretation and even metaphor, as much as some might like 
to pretend it can be purely objective, mathematical, or centered in laboratories.5 
Whether you come to this essay as a philosopher, a lawyer, or a student, or even 
4 B. de Sousa Santos (ed.), Cognitive justice in a global world : Prudent knowledges for a decent life, Lantham, Mary-
land, Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
5 D. McCluskey, “The Rhetoric of Economics”, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 31, no 2, 1983, p. 481.
2015/4 | |415Journal européen des droits de l’hommeEuropean Journal of Human Rights
DossierEnsuring that Everyone Benefits from Scientific and Technological Progress
simply an activist who wishes to be thoughtful and reflective about your work, 
you are in my estimation, a scientist.
II. Foundational Principles
This section develops four ideas about the foundational principles underlying 
the right to science. First, it emphasizes the instrumental and intrinsic value of 
science – both as a means to a technological end, and as a process or activity in 
which human beings individually and collectively give expression to an impor-
tant aspect of our humanity. Second, the discussion juxtaposes three conceptions 
about the aims of science and argues that the human rights vision requires a 
prioritization of science in service of humanity. Third, the essay emphasizes the 
importance of recognizing science and technology as global public goods, to be 
cultivated and encouraged by States, civil society, and the international commu-
nity for the benefit of all. Fourth and finally, the discussion highlights attention 
to the touchstone values of inclusivity and participation, both for conducting the 
scientific process and for ensuring access to its technological fruits.
A. The Value of Science : Both Instrumental 
and Intrinsic
Why should science and technology find a place in the international bill of rights ? 
Occasionally, access to science and technology may be fundamental to human 
survival. This is the case, for example, when we are talking about vital health 
research, essential medicines, or the technology that supports sanitation services 
and clean water. These most essential aspects of science and technology, however, 
are already referenced by other human rights, including the right to health, the 
right to education, and the right to food. The separate recognition of the right to 
science implies a further purpose for science well beyond providing for these basic 
human needs.
The key to uncovering that further purpose lies in looking at the context in which 
the right to science was enshrined in the international human rights texts. The 
right to science always appears right beside the right to culture, within the very 
same article.6 These two concepts are deeply intertwined, so much so that I 
generally prefer to speak of “the right to science and culture” in a unified sense, 
because there is so much overlap between the scientific and cultural aspects.7 In 
the human rights treaties, the right to science and culture always follows imme-
diately after the right to education. This placement is also significant. Unlike the 
rights to health, housing, or food, access to science and technology is not usually 
6 Article 27(1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights ; article 15(1-4) International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights.
7 L. Shaver, “The Right to Science and Culture”, Wisconsin Law Review, vol. 2010, no 1, 2010, p. 121.
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a matter of life and death. It does, however, go to the heart of what kind of life we 
live. Like education and culture, science and technology hold particular power to 
improve human life, raise standards of living and promote other human rights. 
The rights to education, culture, and science have in common a vision of dignified 
human life and community engagement that goes well beyond mere survival and 
security needs. Through education, culture, and science, human beings collabo-
rate to realize values of beauty, creativity, the search for truth, and realization of 
a better tomorrow.
The value of science then, is not purely instrumental. Yes, science and technology 
also have significant utilitarian value. They can be deployed to solve social prob-
lems and improve our material situation. But there is also a value inherent in the 
process itself, as with the educational process. Engaging in cultural manifestations 
such as art, literature, music, and theatre helps us to realize and express parts of 
our shared humanity, which has value from the perspective of individual develop-
ment and the shared life of the community. Engaging in scientific discovery and 
technological innovation does as well. Human beings are naturally curious about 
our world. We seek to understand it. We seek to solve the problems we perceive 
in it. This is a beautiful and precious part of the human personality. The right to 
science envisages the scientific and technological endeavor as a process that every 
person is entitled to participate in – a collective and collaborative process that can 
help to unite a frequently fragmented world.
B. Science in Service of Humanity
Although science will ideally reflect and serve these humane values, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that scientific inquiry and technology are not inherently 
good. They are rather vehicles that will serve whatever values they are guided 
by, for good or for evil. The international bill of rights is not neutral as to these 
values. When the international community first came together to recognize and 
enshrine a right to science in the post-WWII moment, historical circumstances 
made them keenly aware of the immense harm that can come from the misuse 
of science. Science in service of authoritarianism had advanced the ends of 
violence, torture, murder, and genocide. Nazi scientists had declared the biolog-
ical inferiority of non-Aryan races and provided the ideological support for “social 
cleansing” campaigns that would target Jews, homosexuals, and the mentally 
and physically handicapped, among other minority populations. American scien-
tists had perfected the means to annihilate cities through nuclear attack. Fire 
bombing, chemical gassing, the atom bomb, and many other technologies for 
mass murder… these were among the fruits borne through the vision of science 
in service to the State.
Bearing in mind these bitter lessons, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
articulated a decidedly different vision : that of science in service of humanity. A 
science that is deployed to alleviate human suffering and to improve the human 
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condition. A science that is committed to high ethical standards, conducted 
always in ways that are respectful of other human rights. By enshrining this right 
in the Declaration and by establishing UNESCO, the international community 
articulated an alternative vision for scientific and technological development, 
one which recognizes and honors our common humanity by advancing norms of 
dignity, equality, and freedom. When these humane values are placed at the heart 
of the scientific process, it becomes more likely that the resulting applications will 
enhance, rather than threaten, the enjoyment of the full range of human rights.8
C. Science as a Public Good
In our own time, however, this vision of science in service to humanity is threat-
ened by a new competing vision : that of science in service of profit. In much of 
our contemporary public discourse, financial profit and economic growth have 
come to be seen as both the purpose of science and technological innovation, as 
well as its primary incentive. This shift in philosophical emphasis corresponds 
with a decline in public investment in science and increasing support for the 
privatization of research and the commodification of innovation. To be sure, 
there are many things that markets and for-profit businesses do more efficiently 
than governments or the social sector, and private entrepreneurship is an essen-
tial pillar of economic welfare and human freedom. Yet the philosophy of science 
in service of profit seems to me to have the ordering of means and ends backward. 
Harnessing private enterprise to advance scientific research and technological 
development is all for the good. But to view scientific research and technological 
development as the servant to enterprise is to put the cart before the horse, and 
to unwisely divorce science from its much-needed ethical grounding. Science in 
service of profit is likely to deliver on its promise of delivering a return on private 
investment, but it is likely to fail in realizing the larger potential of service to 
humanity.
What is needed is a renewed political and ethical commitment to the pursuit 
of science as a public good. To call science a human right is precisely to insist 
that the supply of scientific knowledge and the development of technology must 
not be left entirely  – or even primarily  – to market forces. This is true, in the 
first instance, because science and technology are dependent upon state support 
to realize their fullest potential.9 Just as important is the need for distributive 
justice. As with health care and education, there is a moral as well as economic 
value in making science and technology accessible to all, regardless of any 
particular individual’s ability to pay. To claim the right to science is to insist that 
both the process and the products of science must be understood as public goods 
intended for the benefit of all, not merely the already privileged, who are best 
positioned to purchase access in a marketplace. This implies that scientific and 
8 R.  Claude, Science in the service of human rights, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2002.
9 M. Mazzucato, The entrepreneurial state : Debunking public vs. private sector myths, New York, Anthem Press, 2014.
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technological research should be the target of public funding, and that innova-
tion policy should prioritize socially valuable ends and the widespread diffusion 
of technological benefits, especially to benefit vulnerable populations. Science in 
pursuit of profit will not accomplish this end ; science must be ethically grounded 
in a vision of service to humanity.
D. Inclusivity and Participation
Ensuring that everyone benefits from scientific and technological progress, 
however, cannot be a top-down effort. Achieving this goal depends instead upon 
broad participation in the process of science. Because the forces shaping scientific 
advancement are complex, technological progress is often mystified. To outsiders, 
it may seem that scientific progress is a natural process that simply “happens.” 
To the casual observer, it may seem that a new technology simply “appears,” and 
a short while later, everyone seems to have one. Scholars in the field of Science 
and Technology Studies offer an important corrective perspective. This discipline 
investigates science and technology as products of social processes engaged in 
by real people. Science and technology, like politics and culture generally, do not 
proceed inevitably in a predetermined direction. Rather, the path they follow in 
any particular social and historical context is the product of both the individual 
choices of scientists and larger social forces. Public policy and legal regulation 
shape which technologies are pursued and set the conditions under which their 
spread may be accelerated or delayed. These individual and collective choices can 
and must be guided by ethical judgments, including a commitment to widespread 
public benefit.
When these normative choices are obscured or neglected, the scientific process 
can easily drift from its mission of service to humanity. Technological develop-
ment may end up catering to only a narrow elite, failing to serve those most in 
need. The challenge of ensuring that everyone benefits from scientific and tech-
nological progress requires broader participation and ethical accountability. The 
ethical emphasis on participation extends not only to ensuring universal access 
to the ultimate technological fruits of the scientific endeavor ; public participa-
tion must also inform the values that guide the scientific process itself. Scientific 
disciplines and technological fields must ensure that they are truly open to equal 
participation by women and minority populations. Scientists and technologists 
should also take up the responsibility to ensure that their work is responsive to 
social needs, informed by outside perspectives and knowledge, and translated to 
reach beyond “the ivory tower.” As the scientific process is guided by such values, 
it becomes more and more likely that the technological results will in fact be 
useful and accessible to all, promoting lives with dignity, especially for the most 
vulnerable.
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III. Minimum core content
So far this essay has offered a view of the right to science as shaped by four foun-
dational principles : recognition of the intrinsic as well as instrumental value 
of science, an ethical insistence upon science in service of humanity, a political 
commitment to science as a public good, and an emphasis on the importance of 
broad participation. The second half of this essay explores what these general 
principles underlying the right to science imply, in terms of specific legal obliga-
tions and policy priorities.
One important tool that scholars and jurists have used to concretize the legal 
obligations corresponding to various human rights is the concept of “minimum 
core content.” Socioeconomic rights are subject to the logic of “progressive real-
ization” in the context of resource constraints. Yet the Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights has repeatedly emphasized that it is also possible 
to identify a “minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the 
very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights.”10 “Minimum core” 
approaches to human rights interpretation identify specific standards around 
which there is widespread agreement, which apply even in contexts of very limited 
resources, or which a nation’s failure to honor will be subject to legal censure. 
The explicit understanding is that these minimum standards are not meant to 
limit broader understandings of the right. They serve as a baseline or floor, from 
which upward movement should be continuously pursued. This “minimum core 
content” approach has been deployed by juridical bodies such as the Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and national courts, as well as 
by human rights scholars, as a method of translating human rights principles into 
concrete obligations.
One such scholar Katherine Young, has sought to clarify the concept of minimum 
core content by delineating multiple possible approaches to defining the minimum 
core content of a right, each of which has precedent in human rights law and 
Committee practice.11 One approach seeks to locate the “core consensus” content 
of the right, distinguishing this from marginal aspects of the right, upon which 
disagreement is to be honored. A second approach seeks to identify the “norma-
tive essence” of the right, defining a minimum level of the right that is neces-
sary to honor fundamental principles of dignity, equality, and freedom. The third 
approach attempts to define “minimum obligations” that States must implement 
as a matter of priority, or be judged to have violated the right through omission. 
Each of these approaches has a unique emphasis and offers a unique perspective. 
Efforts to clarify the right to science should draw on all three of these approaches, 
ideally with an explicit awareness of their complementarities and limitations.
10 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, Report on the Fifth Session, 26  November-14  December 
1990, (E/1991/23).
11 K. Young, “The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights : A Concept in Search of Content”, Yale Journal of 
International Law, vol. 33, no 1, 2008, p. 113.
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The sections that follow apply each of these three approaches to help identify 
minimum core content for the right to science. This discussion will first high-
light some problems with utilizing the “core consensus” approach for the right 
to science. Next I will recommend the “normative essence” approach as a more 
promising starting point for this particular human right. Finally, the discussion 
will examine how to translate the right to science into “minimum obligations.” The 
article then concludes with a proposed fourth “pragmatic approach” to defining 
the minimum core content of the right to science.
A. The “Core Consensus” Approach
The essence of the “core consensus” approach is to locate a minimum core content 
of a right upon which there is widespread agreement, whereas debate may still 
exist at the margins of a right. Young describes the “core consensus” approach as 
being more positivist in nature, since it looks to State practice to identify areas of 
agreement.12 Because it builds upon consensus, this approach has political advan-
tages for institutions that must carefully tend to their legitimacy. A drawback of 
this approach is that it may be overly conservative, tending toward the “lowest 
common denominator,” and thereby failing to adequately defend the interests of 
vulnerable individuals. Normative consensus can shift to become either more or 
less accommodating of human rights claims ; it can also reflect political consider-
ations at odds with human rights norms.
For example, there was long a stable political and juridical consensus in Brazil 
that all citizens were entitled to receive prescribed medications free of charge.13 
This consensus went hand-in-hand with an administrative and regulatory struc-
ture that emphasized public-sector pharmaceutical research and development 
and forbade the granting of patents on products important to human health. 
During international trade negotiations in the 1990s, pharmaceutical industry 
groups successfully pushed for new international patent rules. As a result, Brazil 
and many other countries were required to revise their domestic laws to extend 
patent protection to pharmaceuticals. The prices of medicines have risen signif-
icantly as a result, and Brazil’s health budgets are now under significant strain. 
Reflecting this new financial pressure, the political and judicial consensus in favor 
of free provision of medicines as a basic human right now shows signs of unrav-
eling.14
This story of access to medicines illustrates several problematic results of the 
“core consensus” approach as applied to the right to science. First, the consensus 
on how to balance patent protection and access to medicines has shifted and 
12 K. Young, op. cit., pp. 142-144.
13 S. Monica, R. Guise, D. Wang, T. de Campos, “Access to Medicines : Pharmaceutical Patents and the Right to 
Health”, in L. Shaver (ed.), Access to Knowledge in Brazil : New Research on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Devel-
opment, New Haven, Connecticut, Information Society Project, 2010, p. 103.
14 Ibidem, pp. 103-132.
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continues to shift over time…a nd not always in the direction of expanded sensi-
tivity to human rights. Were this discussion of the right to science taking place 
thirty years ago, we would naturally have pointed out that there was no interna-
tional consensus in favor of patent protection for pharmaceutical technologies. 
Yet today there is as a matter of positive law a strong international consensus 
that patents must be granted in all fields, including pharmaceuticals. This legal 
consensus has emerged because multinational companies successfully leveraged 
international trade negotiations to advance their own financial interests… often 
at the expense of public interests.15 It would be a mistake, however, to bless 
a consensus of State practice produced in this manner with the human rights 
stamp of approval.
The Brazilian example also highlights a second dynamic : the troubling tendency 
of an emphasis on consensus to empower restrictive interpretations of human 
rights. The Venice Statement emphasizes that the right to science is often in 
tension with intellectual property protections, “which should be managed in 
accordance with a common responsibility to prevent the unacceptable prioritiza-
tion of profit for some over benefit for all”.16 The Special Rapporteur in the field of 
cultural rights has similarly recommended States to “guard against promoting the 
privatization of knowledge to an extent that deprives individuals of opportunities 
to take part in cultural life and enjoy the fruits of scientific progress, and conse-
quently to reconsider the current maximalist intellectual property approach….”17 
Given the economic value of patent rights to politically powerful actors, however, 
it is highly unlikely that we will ever observe a consensus in favor of restricting 
them, no matter how strong the public policy arguments for doing so might be. 
Emphasizing a consensus approach to defining the minimum core content of the 
right to science, therefore, could empower powerful groups to successfully oppose 
recognition of the human rights of the vulnerable.
On the other hand, some aspects of the right to science do already have a 
stronger consensus behind them. For example, calls to respect academic and 
scientific freedom, and to enforce safeguards for human research subjects, are 
ones that admit little disagreement, at least in principle. There is also widespread 
support in scientific fields for the desirability of open access publishing. Thus in 
certain areas it may be possible to point to some minimum core content on the 
basis of a consensus principle. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that the 
emphasis on consensus does not become a tool for limiting rights, particularly 
where intellectual property regimes are concerned. The “minimum core” of the 
right to science should not be confined only to respect for academic freedom and 
ethical safeguards on research  – both of which are already justifiable on other 
15 S. Sell, Private Power, Public Law : The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2003.
16 United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization, Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits 
of Scientific Progress and its Applications, 16-17 July 2009.
17 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, 
op. cit.
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human rights grounds, such as freedom of speech and the right to health. The 
potentially unique contributions of the right to science, for instance in under-
scoring the need to cultivate scientific knowledge and research as a public good, 
and addressing the problems of inequitable access to technology, require looking 
beyond easy consensus.
In sum, the core consensus approach is problematic when it comes to the right 
to science, because the recently dominant approach to technology policy so 
relentlessly emphasizes market orientation, privatization, and exclusivity of 
access-values antithetical to the grounding principles of the right. The right to 
science is an area of human rights law where the gap between right and reality 
looms particularly wide. If we seek to locate the right within an existing polit-
ical consensus, we may miss it entirely. The project must be understood as one 
of building consensus around the right to science, rather than recognizing and 
formalizing a consensus already present.
B. The “Normative Essence” Approach
The “normative essence” approach reasons from foundational normative values 
of dignity, equality, and freedom, to specify a minimum core of each human right 
that is essential to upholding these values. This may take the form of a “basic 
needs” emphasis, seeking to define the degree of enjoyment of the right that is 
necessary and generally sufficient to preserve human life. Or the approach may be 
more expansive, seeking to guarantee not only survival but also to provide condi-
tions for a broader conception of human flourishing-protecting not just life, but 
life with dignity. In this second vein, the “human capabilities” approach seeks to 
define a set of basic entitlements well beyond mere survival, to which every indi-
vidual has a strong moral claim. Either way, both approaches have in common the 
desire to specify a degree of enjoyment of the right to which no individual should 
be denied, which is defined with regard to underlying universal values.
In the area of the right to science, the “normative essence” approach can be 
applied in several ways.
First, we might define certain “essential technologies” as fundamental to a digni-
fied life, and require States to ensure that these technologies are accessible to 
all. It would, for example, be easy to place water purification technology, sani-
tation, and essential medicines on this list. These technologies are understood 
as important to basic survival. Moving beyond mere survival to include criteria 
of dignity, equality, and freedom would expand the list of essential technolo-
gies further. Electricity, telephone service, and Internet access probably qualify 
for this more inclusive list of technologies essential for realizing human capa-
bilities. This approach to a minimum core already finds support in the Special 
Rapporteur’s Report on the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and 
its applications, which has emphasized that : “A core principle is that innovations 
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essential for a life with dignity should be accessible to everyone, in particular 
marginalized populations.”18 The Report recommends that this goal be achieved 
through consultation to identify the priority needs of marginalized populations 
for public subsidies and targeted research,19 as well as through public utilities to 
ensure universal access to electricity, telephone, and Internet services.20
Second, beyond the emphasis on access to specific technologies  – the concrete 
benefits of scientific progress  – the right to science also emphasizes sharing in 
the process of scientific progress itself. Here, the essential minimum approach 
points to minimum core content such as access for all to basic scientific educa-
tion, access to the tools for continually studying the world around them (such as 
literacy, books, and the Internet), protection of their safety and dignity when they 
participate as research subjects or are otherwise subjected to new technologies 
in a context of vulnerability, and consideration of their needs and priorities in 
shaping the direction of scientific research and technological development. These 
aspects of minimum core content, too, already find recognition in the Report of 
the Special Rapporteur.
One virtue of the essential minimum approach to defining a minimum core 
content is that it works well to focus attention on the basic needs of vulnerable 
populations. Emphasizing universal access to water and electricity will deliver the 
greatest benefit to the poorest groups within each society. Yet poverty is not the 
only dimension of social vulnerability that can be addressed by this approach. 
From a gender perspective, access to certain technologies can also greatly relieve 
the disparate psychological, physical, and health burdens placed upon women. 
Technologies fundamental to gender equality include family planning methods to 
reduce the health burdens of high-multiples pregnancy, an easily accessible water 
supply to relieve girls and women of the burden of water-carrying, and modern 
systems of fuel delivery for cooking food to avoid unhealthy daily exposure to 
smoke. Women’s rights advocates have also pointed out the importance of access 
to a simple yet often socially taboo technology : the sanitary pad. Women and 
girls who lack the resources to purchase this modern technology tend to endure 
shame, miss school, and be socially isolated. Disability advocates could likewise 
identify certain adaptive technologies as essential to ensuring lives of dignity and 
equality for persons with special needs.
A unique challenge in applying the “essential minimum” approach to the right to 
science lies in the special nature of technology as the object of this right. We must 
take care to guard against two common errors. The first is related to our concep-
tion of what counts as technology. The second is related to which technologies 
18 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, 
op. cit.
19 Ibidem.
20 Ibidem.
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qualify as essential. Both of these pitfalls can tempt us to take too limited a vision 
of the scope of essential technologies.
First, we must not be too narrow in our concept of what qualifies as technology. 
There is an incredible gap in the level of access to technology enjoyed by the most 
privileged sector of humanity and the least privileged sector. This might cause 
us to conceive of technology too narrowly as only the latest and most “cutting-
edge” innovations, such as sophisticated smartphones and gene therapy. The 
technologies of greatest relevance to vulnerable groups, however, are likely to be 
much more basic and may even be decades old. I have in mind examples such 
as indoor electricity for lighting, systems for delivering running water to homes 
and containing waste, and oral rehydration salts to treat acute gastrointestinal 
illnesses. These are technologies in the sense that they are tools developed by 
human ingenuity to solve particular problems. Individually and collectively they 
have improved and saved many millions of lives. To leverage the right to science 
in a way that is actually useful for marginalized groups, we will need to be broad 
and inclusive in our conception of technology, both old and new.
Second, we must resist the temptation to be too stingy in our concept of which 
technologies are essential. Technology advances, and the list of technologies 
deemed essential to a life of dignity and freedom must expand accordingly.21 It 
may feel particularly awkward to recognize newer technologies – such as Internet 
access – as essential ones. After all, until very recently, everyone made do without 
that particular technology, and we would not say that the lives we led then were 
lacking in dignity or freedom. But if “the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications” means anything, it is precisely that these new inno-
vations and technologies are to be enjoyed by all. Fifty years ago, we could not 
have said that there was a universal human right to antiretroviral therapy for HIV 
infection ; neither antiretrovirals nor HIV was known at the time. Yet today it is 
not difficult to recognize such medicines as an essential innovation from a human 
rights perspective.22
These two cautionary principles operate in a complementary way. The first reminds 
us not to overlook technologies that might seem too old. The second reminds us 
not to rule out technologies that might seem too new. An essential technology, 
from the view of human rights, may be very old or very new. The limiting prin-
ciple is not the age of the technology, but its importance for promoting human 
freedom, dignity, and equality.
This last caveat points to one final challenge in applying the “essential minimum” 
approach to the right to science or any human right : it often remains difficult 
21 M. Land, “Toward an International Law of the Internet”, Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 54, no 2, 2013, 
p. 393.
22 Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (Supreme Tribunal of Justice – Venezuela), 15 July 1999, Cruz del Valle Bermúdez 
y otros vs. MSAS s/amparo. Expediente No. 15.789. Sentencia No. 196. This case recognized access to state of the art 
HIV medications as required by the right to life, the right to health, and the right to science.
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to get very specific in defining the content of the right. To translate the right to 
science as universal access to essential technologies is to replace a very abstract 
principle with an only somewhat less abstract one. It still remains to be defined 
which technologies are essential to dignity, freedom, and equality. It also remains 
to be defined what exactly States must do to ensure that access, ranging from 
subsidies for research and commercialization to direct procurement or provision. 
This remaining ambiguity may be a fault or a virtue. On the negative side, we may 
be left with less clarity and specificity than had been sought. On the positive side, 
it may be appropriate to leave this clarification and concretization to domestic 
processes of advocacy, policy-making, and adjudication, in light of particular 
national priorities and needs.
C. The “Minimum Obligations” approach
In contrast to the “normative essence” and “consensus core” approaches, the 
“minimum obligations” approach has been more explicitly focused on defining 
not the right itself, but the corresponding duties of States. This emphasis is 
intended to make human rights particularly useful for guiding public policy, to 
facilitate more effective international supervision, and to enable domestic and 
regional rights adjudication. The “minimum obligations” approach goes hand-
in-hand with the “violations approach” to human rights, which seeks to define 
human rights and their corresponding State duties specifically enough to enable 
their justiciability in particular cases. It may also serve as a framework for priority 
setting in national policymaking and international cooperation. The minimum 
obligations approach often builds on the normative essence or consensus core 
approaches, translating the rights identified there into duties, and identifying 
which corresponding State duties are most appropriate to insist upon.23
The “minimum obligations” approach can also be related to the effort to distin-
guish between positive obligations requiring States to act in certain ways that 
promote the enjoyment of human rights versus negative obligations requiring 
States to refrain from activities that would prejudice human rights. A more elabo-
rate three-part approach, conceiving of government duties to respect, protect, and 
fulfill human rights, is often used to elaborate different ways in which government 
actions or inactions relate to the right. For example, governments have a duty to 
respect the right to science by refraining from activities that would interfere with 
academic freedom.24 Mere inaction in respect of the right to science, however, will 
not go very far to ensuring its enjoyment ; active steps are also required. Govern-
ments can protect the right to science by ensuring that intellectual property rules 
are well designed to promote creativity and innovation without unduly sacrificing 
23 K. Young, op. cit.
24 Y. Donders, “The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress : in Search of State Obligations in relation to 
Health”, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, vol. 14, no 4, 2011, p. 371.
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participation and access,25 and by using effective regulatory procedures to protect 
the safety and dignity of human research subjects.26 Governments can fulfill the 
right to science by funding research and development, establishing mechanisms 
that enhance popular participation in science and providing science education 
through public schooling and publicly supported media.
Another way to think of the minimum obligations approach is in tandem with 
the principle of progressive realization. It is well understood that the realization 
of socioeconomic rights is often significantly constrained by limits on govern-
ment resources, which differ greatly from country to country. Yet the principle is 
also well established that certain priority aspects of human rights require imme-
diate implementation by all countries. This may be so because implementation 
of that priority aspect does not require great resources. Alternatively, even if the 
resource investment may be substantial, the cost-to-benefit calculus is never-
theless compelling. For example, in the area of the right to housing, minimum 
obligations include the government duty to respect the right to housing by not 
conducting illegal evictions. A government can hardly claim that it is too poor 
to grant due process and consideration for human rights before evicting people 
from their land or homes.27 Minimum obligations with respect to the right to 
education have similarly been defined to include providing free and universal 
primary education.28 No doubt, significant financial resources must be mobi-
lized to comply with this duty. Yet the normative and utilitarian justifications for 
universal primary education are so overwhelming that a State’s failure to do so 
simply cannot be reconciled as reasonable priority setting.
Applying this approach, the minimum core content of the right to science would 
include efforts to expand access to technology and opportunities for scientific 
participation that are highly cost-effective. Access to clean water, sanitation 
services, electricity and other essential technologies should be universalized. 
Academic freedom and Internet freedom should be respected. Technology should 
not be used in ways that abuse privacy or other human rights. Governments 
should ensure that intellectual property rules are adopted through a publicly 
transparent process that allows the concerns of authors and the public to be 
addressed.29 Scientific publications subsidized by government funding should be 
made available to the public at large, rather than only through private services 
25 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (14 December 2001) (E/C.12/2001/15).
26 Y. Donders, op. cit.
27 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report on the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Sessions, 
28 April-16 May 1997, 17 November-5 December 1997, (E/1991/22).
28 Article 13(2)(a) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
29 Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights Ms. Farida Shaheed on copyright policy and the 
right to science and culture, presented at the twenty-eighth session of the Human Rights Council (24 May 2014) 
(A/HRC/28/57) ; United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Independent expert calls for 
an end to secret negotiations of free trade and investment agreements until public consultation and participation is 
ensured and independent human rights impact assessments are conducted (30 March 2015).
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that restrict public access.30 These are just a few examples of highly cost-effective 
ways of respecting, protecting, and fulfilling the right to science.
IV. A Pragmatic approach
Katharine Young’s work delineating the three major approaches to defining 
the minimum core content of human rights points out that there are multiple 
methods and purposes to defining a minimum core. As Young herself suggests, 
a self-conscious examination of those purposes may help to guide the process. 
Some familiar motivations for defining a minimum core are to focus public pres-
sure on the most urgent issues, to prioritize the needs of vulnerable popula-
tions, to deflate excuses of “limited resources” and “progressive realization,” or to 
advance human rights along the lines most compatible with preserving institu-
tional legitimacy. Bearing these or similar goals in mind, we may work backward 
to guide our definition of minimum core content in a way that most effectively 
addresses these needs. Young does not offer a label for this alternative approach 
to defining a minimum core, but I propose we think of it as a “pragmatic approach” 
to minimum core content.
In line with this recognition, I suggest that it is natural and appropriate for 
efforts to elaborate the minimum core content of a right to be responsive to the 
particular challenges and issues of the time. An emphasis on particular content 
of urgency today need not limit efforts to recognize and emphasize other aspects 
of the right in the future, as new needs and challenges are encountered. For 
instance, the current emphasis on access to essential medicines is an appropriate 
and necessary response to a particular human rights crisis of our own time : the 
deaths of millions of people in the prime of their lives from diseases for which 
effective treatments exist, but which are being denied in the name of intellectual 
property. A focus today on assuring access to essential medicines today need not 
mean that the right to science is inherently tied to pharmaceuticals more so than 
other forms of technology. It is simply the emphasis of a particularly important 
and timely aspect of the right. The right to science perspective helps to emphasize 
that the human rights issue is not only one of ensuring universal access to the 
drugs that exist today, but also reorienting pharmaceutical policy to better meet 
the needs of vulnerable populations through future research and development.
The arena of copyright law also reveals urgent conflicts between the privatiza-
tion of knowledge and the right to science. Digital technology today offers the 
ability to reproduce and share written works at extremely low cost, unimpeded by 
traditional geographic barriers or the weak state of book publishing and retail in 
developing countries. We finally have the tools to end the “book famine” that has 
30 Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights Ms. Farida Shaheed on copyright policy and the 
right to science and culture, op. cit.
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traditionally plagued higher education and scholarly research in many countries 
of the world. Yet there is a conflict between scholars and students who wish to 
access these works easily and affordably, and the companies that hold the copy-
rights in them, who wish to obtain as much revenue as possible. One study calcu-
lated that to legally purchase the required readings for the first year of university 
studies in Brazil would cost six to ten months’ income at the minimum wage.31 
Such a large gap between price and the ability to pay is not sustainable. Solutions 
must be found that better balance the needs of authors and readers to promote 
broader access to scientific knowledge.
Also related is the call to require that scientific research be published on an Open 
Access model, ensuring its ability to be legally distributed and shared. This call 
responds to the increasing financial pressures faced by academic libraries even 
at institutions as wealthy as Harvard University. But it is particularly important 
to the ability of scholars in developing countries to participate in the scientific 
process. Because academic works in particular are produced according to incentive 
structures based on university employment, public subsidy, academic reputation, 
and the individual desire to contribute to shared knowledge, this is an area in 
which it makes particular sense to emphasize openness and intellectual freedom 
over treatment as private property. Similarly, Open Access initiatives for primary 
and secondary textbooks can help address the textbook shortage that critically 
undermines education in many developing countries, particularly for children 
from poorer families. These calls have recently found support in the report of 
the Special Rapporteur on copyright policy and the right to science and culture.32
There are also positive developments that need encouragement to be carried 
forward. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) recently concluded 
a treaty designed to expand access to copyrighted works : The Marrakesh Treaty 
to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually 
Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled. Previously international treaty-making 
had focused only on expanding protection for intellectual property. This is the 
first international instrument designed to ensure that copyright law does not act 
as a barrier to access and participation. There is great potential in continuing this 
approach to further advance the right to science. Already debate is underway on 
international instruments to facilitate additional exceptions and limitations to 
copyright to assist the work of educational and research institutions and libraries.
The several examples presented above all reflect a common theme. One of the 
great challenges of our time, to which the right to science must respond, is the 
privatization of the scientific enterprise and the neglect of public welfare in the 
name of intellectual property. The emphasis has come to be placed too strongly 
31 P. Mizukami et al., “Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright in Brazil : A Call for Reform” in L. Shaver (ed.), 
Access to Knowledge in Brazil : New Research on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Development, New Haven Connect-
icut, Information Society Project, 2010, p. 103.
32 Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights Ms. Farida Shaheed on copyright policy and the 
right to science and culture, op. cit.
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on the prioritization of profit and the logic of the market, too often to the neglect 
of the moral imperative for science to serve human needs. The tendency to regu-
late intellectual property in the sphere of international trade has aggravated this 
imbalance. A human rights perspective is urgently needed in this debate. The 
call to reinvigorate the orientation of the scientific enterprise as a public good in 
service of humanity and the call to insist upon universal access to the benefits of 
technology will come from human rights institutions or it will not come at all. The 
right to science offers a particularly apt and timely framework for reasserting this 
ethical perspective in the international sphere. Human rights institutions may 
feel that they have lesser expertise or lesser competency to speak about intellec-
tual property law. That competency must be acquired, just as it was when human 
rights institutions began to participate in conversations about global public 
health.
Of course, the challenges of today are not only about intellectual property. The 
age-old struggle between freedom and despotism continues to play out, in the 
arena of science and more broadly. Many States are tempted to restrain the 
academic enterprise or to control their citizens’ Internet use as a means to repress 
political criticism. This too, must be condemned from the perspective of the right 
to science. We must ensure that the Internet remains a force for promoting 
freedom, and that controls are not imposed in the name of national security or 
intellectual property, which will later be abused to restrict the free exchange of 
ideas. We also continue to face the challenge of expanding access to education, 
improving its quality at all levels, and protecting academic independence. The 
right to science can offer a normative framework for guiding respect for intellec-
tual freedom both online and offline.
V. Conclusion
By now we are well accustomed to viewing education and health care as public 
goods, to be publicly supported and made available for the benefit of all. The right 
to science encourages us to approach science and technology in a similar way. 
Technology has a great capacity to save and improve lives, when it is directed to 
those ends. Beyond the utilitarian value of technology, participation in the collec-
tive process of scientific and technological development has an intrinsic value – 
as an opportunity to give expression to our human nature, cultivate the human 
personality, and build international understanding. For both sets of reasons, it is 
vital that active efforts be taken to ensure that all people enjoy opportunities to 
participate in the scientific process and benefit from essential technologies, both 
old and new.
Translating this broad vision of science in service of humanity into minimum core 
content is both fruitful and challenging. In some areas, such as academic freedom 
and protection of research subjects, substantial consensus exists on specific 
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norms. In other areas, particularly with respect to access to technology, the chal-
lenge remains one of building consensus. Indeed, the modern direction of interna-
tional rulemaking around intellectual property has tended to be one that margin-
alizes and undermines the right to science, rather than respecting and fulfilling 
it. Here the problem of pharmaceutical patents and access to essential medicines 
is merely a particularly high-stakes example of the broader tension between the 
right to science and intellectual property regimes. This tension presents both a 
challenge to enjoyment of the right to science and an opportunity for human 
rights institutions to make a difference. The essence of the right to science is to 
insist that scientific learning and essential technologies be made available to all. 
Patent and copyright rules must be designed to strike an appropriate balance 
between incentivizing innovation and creativity and ensuring broad access to 
scientific knowledge and new technologies. Public funding must fill the gap to 
ensure that the needs of marginalized groups are being addressed, despite the 
necessarily lower profit potential. Leveraging the human rights perspective can 
help these goals to become a reality.
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